

LANGUAGE, POLITICS AND POWER: THEORETICAL, METHODOLOGICAL, PRACTICAL AND EMPIRICAL PARAMETERS OF RELATIONSHIP

The article is devoted to analyzing theoretical, methodological, practical and empirical parameters of the interconnection among language, politics and power, including through the prism of ideology. The author affirmed that language is a driving force for changing politics and society, because it influences and depends on them. At the same time, it was stated that language as an instrument of influence and social differentiation is certainly political, but it can also be politicized. The “imperialism” of language, thus hypothetically resulted, is a linguistic and political planning strategy on the basis of which political elite promotes its own language through power structures. It was also justified that language is a form of social and even political action and reality, which is always determined by values and norms, political conventions, ideologies and social practices, and is always delimited by the influence of power structures and historical processes.

Keywords: language, discourse, politics, power, ideology, society, influence.

Tamara Kozak

МОВА, ПОЛІТИКА ТА ВЛАДА: ТЕОРЕТИКО-МЕТОДОЛОГІЧНІ ТА ПРАКТИЧНО-ЕМПІРИЧНІ ПАРАМЕТРИ ВЗАЄМОЗВ'ЯЗКУ

Проаналізовано теоретико-методологічні та практично-емпіричні параметри взаємозв'язку мови, політики та влади, в тому числі крізь призму ідеології. Встановлено, що мова є рушійною силою, яка спрямована на зміну політики й суспільства, адже вона впливає на них і залежить від них. Водночас констатовано, що мова як інструмент впливу та соціальної диференціації безумовно є політичною, проте може бути і політизованою. Гіпотетично результатом таким чином “імперіалізм” мови є стратегією лінгвістично-політичного планування, на підставі якої політична еліта просуває власну мову через владні структури. Також обґрунтовано, що мова є формою соціальної і навіть політичної дії та реальності, яка завжди визначається цінностями і нормами, політичними конвенціями, ідеологіями і соціальними практиками й завжди відмежована впливом владних структур та історичних процесів.

Ключові слова: мова, дискурс, політика, влада, ідеологія, суспільство, вплив.

In the modern world, there is practically no social phenomenon or aspect of human life that would not be political in nature, and therefore would not attract the attention of political analysts. Even mainly “natural” (and therefore, as it is expected, apolitical) problems are more often becoming the subject of political science research, as they relate to politics and power. Accordingly, politics and power are not merely institutionally and conflict-related spheres of social life, but in fact, all social life, even if it is not entirely perceived politically or in terms of power. This is particularly evident, given argumentation that modern politics and power related issues are increasingly less class struggle oriented, but instead focus on post-materialistic values and preferences.

Taking into consideration the above, in recent decades, the problematic of language and politics and power, language in politics and power, and also politics and power in language, among other things, has gained considerable scientific interest. Hence the idea of expediency of studying the language not only as an object of linguistics and literary criticism but also as an object of interest in political science. This, for example, is examined in the scientific works of the following scientists P. Bourdieu¹, R. Bugarski², M. Craith³, D. Crystal⁴, F. Dallmayr⁵, N. Fairclough⁶, H. Gruber and F. Menz⁷, M. Holborow⁸, E. Loos⁹, K. Morrison¹⁰, S. Nahrkhalaji¹¹, A. Pelinka¹², R. Phillipson¹³, T. Ricento¹⁴, P. Seargeant¹⁵, J. Tollefson¹⁶,

¹ Bourdieu P., *Language and Symbolic Power*, Wyd. Polity Press 1991.

² Bugarski R., Language policies in the successor states of former Yugoslavia, *Journal of Language and Politics* 2004, vol 3, nr. 2, s. 189–208.

³ Craith M., *Languages and Power: Accommodation and Resistance*, [w:] Craith M. (ed.), *Language, Power and Identity Politics*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2007, s. 1–20.

⁴ Crystal D., *The Stories of English*, Wyd. Penguin 2004.

⁵ Dallmayr F., *Language and Politics*, Wyd. University of Notre Dame 1984.

⁶ Fairclough N., *Analysing Discourse*, Wyd. Routledge 2003.

⁷ Gruber H., Menz F., Language and political change: Micro- and macro-aspects of a contested relationship?, *Journal of Language and Politics* 2004, vol 3, nr. 2, s. 175–188.

⁸ Holborow M., Language, ideology and neoliberalism, *Journal of Language and Politics* 2007, vol 6, nr. 1, s. 51–73.

⁹ Loos E., Composing “panacea texts” at the European Parliament: An intertextual perspective in text production in a multilingual community, *Journal of Language and Politics* 2004, vol 4, nr. 1, s. 3–26.

¹⁰ Morrison K., Ideology, Linguistic Capital and the Medium of Instruction in Hong Kong, *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development* 2000, vol 21, nr. 6, s. 471–486.

¹¹ Nahrkhalaji S., *Language, Ideology and Power: a Critical Approach to Political Discourse*, źródło: https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/df03/59393b3d61b2033b5a1edce8f7a7ba6cbef7.pdf?_ga=2.256435788.672418996.1572779182-770480320.1572779182 [odczyt: 01.11.2019].

¹² Pelinka A., Language as a political category: The viewpoint of Political Science, *Journal of Language and Politics* 2007, vol 6, nr. 1, s. 129–143.

¹³ Phillipson R., *Linguicism: Structures and Ideologies in Linguistic Imperialism*, [w:] Cummins J., Skutnabb-Kangas T. (eds.), *Minority Education: From Shame to Struggle*, Wyd. Multilingual Matters 1988, s. 339–358.; Phillipson R., *Linguistic Imperialism*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1992.

¹⁴ Ricento T., *Ideology, Politics and Language Policies: Introduction*, [w:] Ricento T. (ed.), *Ideology, Politics and Language Policies: Focus on English*, Wyd. John Benjamins Publishing Company 2000, s. 1–8.; Ricento T., *The limits of language policies in the United States and Canada: Vague intentions, unpredictable outcomes*, Paper presented at the American Association for Applied Linguistics Annual Conference, Washington, March 1999.

¹⁵ Seargeant P., Language ideology, language theory, and the regulation of linguistic behavior, *Language Sciences* 2009, vol 31, s. 345–359.

¹⁶ Tollefson J., *Planning Language, Planning Inequality: Language Policy in the Community*, Wyd. Longman 1991.

R. Wodak¹⁷ and many others. Moreover, this has become the norm not only for political science in general, but also for some of its branches, in particular for comparative politics, which objectively began to appeal to the problems of language in explaining social fragmentation and constructing various models of democratic and autocratic political regimes¹⁸. One of the explanations is that language both reflects and affects the structure of power and therefore can be considered as an indicator of social and political situations.

Therefore most of the available studies claim, that language is a driving force aimed at alteration of politics and society considering its influence and dependence on the latter¹⁹. Nevertheless, the political focus on the language studies is largely limited, since, despite the undeniable connection between politics, power and language, political science is not that interested in generation and structuring of ideas about political aspects of a language. On the contrary, much more research results on this topic are typically received in the linguistics, sociolinguistics and political linguistics environment. At the same time, hardly sole constant problem of the political science regarding relation between language, politics and power is interpreting language as a competitive phenomenon that necessarily causes political consequences²⁰. Additionally, when it comes to political science, language is often positioned as a tool to achieve the goals of certain concepts, for instance, as a function and a means of communication in the tradition of political systems and cybernetics theory; as a part of symbolic politics; as a cause of social fragmentation, that provokes specific political reactions; as a tool for advocacy, competition and mobilization. This means that language, on the one hand, describes politics and power, but, on the other hand, can contribute to the distortion of politics and power²¹. A striking example was the role of language in the rise of the Nazi Party in Germany by 1933 or in the stabilization of the Nazi regime in Germany since 1933. In addition, it fits in well with J. Goebbels's remark that language is both a political tool and an instrument of propaganda and manipulation²². Therefore, its «political power» must be characterized by ambiguous potential²³, since language can be a tool for or against the enlightenment, for or against emancipation, for or against democracy, for or against human rights, etc. Accordingly, language can be used by totalitarian and authoritarian political regimes and as a means of resistance to them as well. At the same time, language policy can promote the formation of states, and may threaten the existence of not only states but also ethnic groups.

¹⁷ Wodak R., Preface. The power of language in political discourse, *Journal of Language and Politics* 2004, vol 3, nr. 3, s. 381–383; Wodak R., *Critical linguistics and critical discourse analysis*, [w:] Verschuren J., Ostaman J., Blommaert J. (eds.), *Handbook of pragmatics-Manual*, Wyd. John Benjamins 1995, s. 204–210; Wodak R., 1968: *The power of political jargon*, [w:] Wodak R. (ed.), *Language, power, ideology*, Wyd. John Benjamins 1989, s. 137–163.

¹⁸ Lijphart A., *Democracy in Plural Societies. A Comparative Exploration*, Wyd. Yale University 1977.

¹⁹ Pelinka A., Language as a political category: The viewpoint of Political Science, *Journal of Language and Politics* 2007, vol 6, nr. 1, s. 129–143.

²⁰ Dallmayr F., *Language and Politics*, Wyd. University of Notre Dame 1984.

²¹ Pelinka A., Language as a political category: The viewpoint of Political Science, *Journal of Language and Politics* 2007, vol 6, nr. 1, s. 129–143.

²² Wodak R., Panagl O., *Text und Kontext. Theoriemodelle und methodische Viverfahren in transdisziplinärenVergleich*, Wyd. Königshausen & Neumann 2004, s. 87–104.

²³ Wodak R., Preface. The power of language in political discourse, *Journal of Language and Politics* 2004, vol 3, nr. 3, s. 381–383.

In this context, the function of modernization and nation-building that is attributed to languages is of particular importance. As G. Almond and B. Powell point out, “nation-building” refers to the “problem of integration and control”²⁴. The fact is that the nation is an idea based on the processes of inclusion and exclusion, entrusted with the territorial dimension of statehood. Therefore, language is one of the criteria that determines the processes of inclusion (in the “we” format) and exclusion (in the “others” format). This determines the fact that modern nation and nationalism are formed as a result of specific understanding of language: identifying “themselves” and separating from “others”. Therefore, language unites, integrating different segments of society into an imaginary nation; however, it also separates, attributing specific features and differences to others in a particular segment of society. Such importance of a language is due to the fact that it is used in a specific analytical case in official or quasi-official political terms, in particular as the official language of the state or linguistic collective memory, which structures social and political differences and relations²⁵. At the same time, language is not the only factor influencing the construction of a nation and a state. Therefore, language itself does not create nations, but it is used for this purpose, because it is an instrument of processes of integration and differentiation that lead to the birth of a nation²⁶, or the localization and hierarchy of societies in modern nation²⁷. With this in mind, language does not necessarily overcome social and political differences, but helps to understand them. Accordingly, language is “the predominant form of modern imagined community”²⁸. This means that language promotes national or ethnic unity, even with other social differences. In this context, language competes with other factors of national creation - religion, geography, history²⁹. However, the defining characteristic of language is that it has the potential to construct a nation because of its functions.

A striking example is the fact that in Austria both until 1938 (the the annexation of *Austria into Nazi Germany*), and after that the majority of the population spoke German, and therefore it was the reason to regard the Austrians as Germans. At the same time, after 1945, without changing the language situation, but as a result of changes in its understanding, the above mentioned fact did not prevent the Austrians from developing and adopting a strong non-German national identity³⁰. As a result, despite changing perceptions, the development of a specific non-German Austrian identity has not eliminated the importance of the German language as a determining factor for Austrian nationality and statehood. The existence of a specific Austrian version of the German language, used for emphasizing the difference between Germany and Austria contributed to this. As a result, the Austrians perceive the

²⁴ Almond G., Powell B., *Comparative Politics. A Developmental Approach*, Wyd. Little, Brown and Co. 1966, s. 314.

²⁵ Lane J.-E., Ersson S., *Politics and Society in Western Europe*, London 1994, s. 52–101.

²⁶ Pelinka A., Language as a political category: The viewpoint of Political Science, *Journal of Language and Politics* 2007, vol 6, nr. 1, s. 129–143.

²⁷ Gellner E., *Nations and Nationalism*, Wyd. Blackwell 1983.

²⁸ Finlayson A., *Imagined Communities*, [w:] Nash K., Scott A. (eds), *The Blackwell Companion to Political Sociology*, Wyd. Blackwell 2001, s. 283.

²⁹ Pelinka A., Language as a political category: The viewpoint of Political Science, *Journal of Language and Politics* 2007, vol 6, nr. 1, s. 129–143.

³⁰ Weiss H., *Nation und Toleranz? Empirische Studien zu nationalen Identitäten in Österreich*, Wyd. Braumüller 2004.

German language as their own.³¹ It determines that the «natural» majority in Austria is German-speaking, but not German population of this nation.³²

In parallel with this, the importance of language in politics can be reduced to minimizing the consequences of other sociopolitical divisions in any society. A vivid example of such kind of logic of the relationship between language and politics is Switzerland, with its inherent differentiation by linguistic and religious principles. In particular, French-speaking Swiss areas are different primarily because their group is characterized by the conflict relations between Catholics and Protestants. Instead, the German-speaking Swiss cantons are more homogeneous, since they are consolidated mainly in terms of language, not religion³³. That is why correlating language and other policy leads to the complication of the latter, while uniting to its simplification. The situation revealing linguistic and religious distance on the island of Cyprus as well as the one illustrating cultural and religious dissonance in the former Yugoslavia (primarily in Bosnia and Herzegovina), serve as examples of conflicts of different periods³⁴. Instead, Croatia, which after 1991 began to differentiate its official language from the former understanding of Serbo-Croatian as one language with two different alphabets, is a good example of solving political problems through a linguistic factor and “erasing” religious context. Such linguistic-political engineering eventually led to shifting the nature of the conflict from linguistic-religious to a merely linguistic conflict, and thus promoted political harmonization³⁵.

To sum up, this means that language always plays a role in politics. Moreover, language is or can be both a catalyst and an interpreter of politics on the highest level of political processes - nation building and state formation. Therefore, political perceptions of language in the construction of social life automatically make it a factor in politics and socio-political differentiation and mobilization³⁶, manifested in the existence of social movements and political parties³⁷. Although language can be both a tool for simplifying and complicating the political process³⁸. In this regard, researchers have traditionally appealed to the linguistic-political experience of Belgium, in which language has proved to be an example of an instrument with effective and mobilizing influence. In this country, two major languages - Flemish (or Dutch) and Walloon (as Romance / French) - did not prevent the unification of the party system in the first half of the twentieth century.

³¹ Wodak R., *Zur diskursiven Konstruktion nationaler Identität*, Wyd. Suhrkamp 1998, s. 133–140.

³² Reiterer A., *Gesellschaft in Österreich*, Wyd. WUV 2003, s. 130–156.

³³ Lijphart A., *Democracy in Plural Societies. A Comparative Exploration*, Wyd. Yale University 1977.

³⁴ Kramer H., Dzihic V., *Die Kosovo Bilanz. Scheitert die internationale Gemeinschaft?*, Wyd. LIT 2005.

³⁵ Bugarski R., Language policies in the successor states of former Yugoslavia, *Journal of Language and Politics* 2004, vol 3, nr. 2, s. 197.; Gruber H., Menz F., Language and political change: Micro- and macro-aspects of a contested relationship?, *Journal of Language and Politics* 2004, vol 3, nr. 2, s. 175–188.

³⁶ Lane J.-E., Ersson S., *Politics and Society in Western Europe*, London 1994, s. 52–101.; Rokkan S., *Staat, Nation und Demokratie in Europa. Die Theorien Stein Rokkans aus seinen gesammelten Werken rekonstruiert und eingeleitet von Peter Flora*, Wyd. Suhrkamp 2000, s. 123–274.

³⁷ Inglehart R., *Modernization and Postmodernization. Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies*, Wyd. Princeton University 1997.

³⁸ Pelinka A., Language as a political category: The viewpoint of Political Science, *Journal of Language and Politics* 2007, vol 6, nr. 1, s. 129–143.

Moreover, in the middle of the twentieth century, the prevailing design of the three-party competition in Belgium (Christian socialists, socialists and liberals as the country's largest political forces) was replaced by a linguistic competition of two blocs, each having a different number of participants, of first, social movements and then, political parties, in particular, Flemish and Walloon linguistically oriented³⁹.

Therefore, language is one of the most powerful factors in identifying and spreading socio-political differences, and thus shaping politically-mobilizing identities and communities. In this context, the experience of Pan-Germanism, Pan-Slavism or the phenomenon of "Italian unity", etc., is remarkable, because it was through the perception and awareness of linguistic differences and commonalities that they were generated and manifested, thus becoming the basis for constructing common cultures and heritage, within very different, however individually related political entities (Germany and Austria, Italy, Slavic states).

The language is also related to other characteristics of social life, such as class, economic and regional differences⁴⁰. The fact is that language, in particular, as an ability to communicate, is an absolute reason and aspect of social development. In this regard, A. Pelinka notes that language, as an ability to speak and write, is specifically linked to the hierarchy of social classes and the perception of vertical difference between them⁴¹. Since class-determined language indicates a certain social and even political position of different groups of asymmetrical society. Similarly, S. Rokkan notes that language is important in the "center-periphery" differences, because it is the language that can generate political discontent of the periphery against the center (as in the case of Flemish language against Walloon in Belgium, Catalan against Spanish (or Castilian) in Spain, Welsh and Gaelic against English in the United Kingdom, Kurdish against Turkish in Turkey, etc)⁴². Linguistic differences also highlight other dimensions of political confrontation. In particular, the racist views of members of the political elite differ significantly from the racist statements of the general public. All this proves that language as a social and political phenomenon can be different—more or less controlled, more or less formalized or hidden—mainly depending on political goals, and therefore on the peculiarities of perception of language as a tool of politics⁴³. This is why, even when language is an unquestionable commonality (unifying factor) of a particular nation (and even more so, when language is not a means of political and national harmonization), its social and political diversity is not excluded at all, but serves, or at least can serve, as an instrument of political mobilization and competition to achieve specific goals and to differentiate the roles of individual subjects and objects of politics, in particular the elites and the masses, social groups, left, right, and centrist parties, and so on. Therefore,

³⁹ Sartori G., *Parties and Party Systems. A Framework for Analysis*, Wyd. ECPR 2005, s. 304; Woyke W., *Das politische System Belgiens*, [w:] Ismayr W. (ed.), *Die politischen Systeme Westeuropas*, Wyd. Leske + Budrich 2003, s. 403–407.

⁴⁰ Lipset S., *Political Man. The Social Bases of Politics*, Wyd. Johns Hopkins University 1983, s. 28–63.

⁴¹ Pelinka A., Language as a political category: The viewpoint of Political Science, *Journal of Language and Politics* 2007, vol 6, nr. 1, s. 129–143.

⁴² Rokkan S., *Staat, Nation und Demokratie in Europa. Die Theorien Stein Rokkans aus seinen gesammelten Werken rekonstruiert und eingeleitet von Peter Flora*, Wyd. Suhrkamp 2000, s. 138–154, 208–233.

⁴³ Wodak R., van Dijk T., *Racism at the Top. Parliamentary Discourses on Ethnic Issues in Six European States*, Wyd. Drava 2000.

language as an instrument of influence and social differentiation is a priori political, but it can also be politicized, mainly due to its sensitivity, openness, activity and strictness⁴⁴.

All this makes it possible to justify that language, being a tool of nation-formation (though not in all states), is at the same time a prerequisite for the development of social and political diversity not only of monoethnic and multinational societies, but also of their political systems. At the same time, from a theoretical and methodological point of view, it is advisable to distinguish different options of linguistic diversity, in particular when: a) within one official language social, regional and cultural differences are traced; b) in the linguistically homogeneous nation / state, languages of national minorities are used in certain spheres of social life; c) languages of national minorities are the result of intensive migration processes; d) the linguistic palette is defined by the coexistence of different languages that have no official status and / or are not regulated. All of these options suggest the possibility, or even the likelihood, of certain assimilation tendencies based on the assumption that there is a formal or informal hierarchical ranking between different languages. The obvious result is quantitative variability in the ranking of languages: the language which is considered as superior «wins», whereas the one that is positioned or perceived as lower «loses». And this, in turn, often leads to unexpected and contradictory linguistic and political tendencies. As, for example, in the case of Slovenian dialect in Carinthia, the speakers of which - Carinthian Slovenians - often deny that they belong to *Slovenian* speaking group⁴⁵. Therefore, different types of social differences are generated by different options of linguistic differences, both in the political context exclusively, and in the political and legal framework. In particular, when linguistically homogeneous nations use minority languages in certain spheres of life, it often leads to constitutional arrangements that give preference to minority languages in certain regions - Swedish in the Åland Islands in Finland or Catalan in Catalonia in Spain. Instead, where minority languages are the result of intense migration processes, it usually causes the need to ponder about policy of multiculturalism, assimilation or integration (as in many Western European countries). Finally, the biggest number of questions and problems arises in the political system when different languages with unsettled status coexist. The situation in Canada, Belgium and Switzerland is a vivid example of such linguistic - political confrontation. Despite the fact that there are distinct linguistic majorities in these countries, English, Dutch and German, correspondingly, it does not imply their official precedence over the other officially recognized languages. Therefore, in the above countries two and more languages (English and French in Canada, Dutch and French (and to a certain extent German) in Belgium, as well as German, French, Italian, Rhaetian in Switzerland, are considered politically equal on the central (federal) level of political management⁴⁶, but on a regional level a monolingual structure prevails.

⁴⁴ Pelinka A. Language as a political category: The viewpoint of Political Science. *Journal of Language and Politics* 2007, vol 6, nr. 1, s. 129–143.

⁴⁵ Reiterer A., *Doktor und Bauer. Ethnischer Konflikt und sozialer Wandel: Die Sozialstruktur der slowenischen Minderheit in Kärnten*, Wyd. Drava 1986, s. 105.

⁴⁶ Pelinka A. Language as a political category: The viewpoint of Political Science. *Journal of Language and Politics* 2007, vol 6, nr. 1, s. 129–143.

The logic in the confederal European Union (EU) and Federal India is somewhat different. If in the former case the principle of linguistic diversity has been laid down⁴⁷ and all the languages are proclaimed as official and equal in the institutional structure of the EU⁴⁸, though in practice English and French dominate⁴⁹. Alternatively, in the latter, 22 languages are proclaimed as officially recognized, but used on the state level. However, according to the constitution, only one language is official on the federal level – Hindi, English being considered semi-official. This is due to the fact that in India there is no single national Indian language, whereas all the 22 Indian languages are sort of minority languages⁵⁰. That is why the linguistic diversity in India is recognized, but not so much as the political pattern of linguistic equality, but with a reservation, according to which all the languages are equally significant, since it is officially claimed that the existence of Indian identity preceded the construction of a federal state⁵¹.

As a consequence, some linguistic diversity options lead to the establishment of the political logic of majoritarian democracies (where competition between majority and minority is constant and predominant), and some options involve the development of consensus-based consociational democracy⁵² (where power-sharing arrangements are embraced and implemented beyond competition by majority and minority). It also means that pragmatic order of languages ranking is becoming more and more characteristic of different countries and international organizations. Especially against the background that political-legal equality and the diversity of all languages cannot overcome the political-linguistic reality in which English is, if not the most widespread, at least the most important second language in the world⁵³. This is especially evident given that the development of democracy in the late XX - early XXI centuries was able to produce an array of theorizations and instrumental formulas (even within constitutional engineering) regarding the possibility of peaceful political and social coexistence against the backdrop of explicit and latent language conflicts. It is up to them to instruct how to act politically in the case of competition and diversity of languages. Accordingly, purely from the theoretical and methodological point of view, pluralism of languages is not positioned today as a direct challenge to democratic regimes, but instead, as an absolute attribute of democracies. However, in the context of the “erosion of democracy”, which became a feature of political development in the second half of the first decade of the twenty first century, as well as given the rejection of some ideas of globalization, now there is an increasing tendency to rethink the relationship between politics and language, especially against the backdrop of the latter’s diversity.

⁴⁷ Laitin D., The cultural identities of a European state, *“Politics and Society”* 1997, vol 25, nr. 3, s. 277–302.

⁴⁸ Loos E., Composing “panacea texts” at the European Parliament: An intertextual perspective in text production in a multilingual community, *“Journal of Language and Politics”* 2004, vol 4, nr. 1, s. 3–26.

⁴⁹ Neisser H., Verschraegen B., *Die Europäische Union. Anspruch und Wirklichkeit*, Wyd. Springer 2001, s. 135.

⁵⁰ Salzmann Z., Stanlaw J., Adachi N., *Language, Culture, and Society: An Introduction to Linguistic Anthropology*, Wyd. Westview Press 2014.; Pelinka A., *Democracy Indian Style. Subhas Chandra Bose and the Creation of India’s Political Culture*, Wyd. Transaction 2003, s. 129–224.

⁵¹ Pelinka A., Language as a political category: The viewpoint of Political Science, *“Journal of Language and Politics”* 2007, vol 6, nr. 1, s. 129–143.

⁵² Lijphart A., *Democracy in Plural Societies. A Comparative Exploration*, Wyd. Yale University 1977.

⁵³ Pelinka A., Language as a political category: The viewpoint of Political Science, *“Journal of Language and Politics”* 2007, vol 6, nr. 1, s. 129–143.

This is largely due to the fact that globalization processes have covered virtually all spheres of social life, with the exception of politics, which still lacks an articulated global structure. This is especially noticeable against the backdrop of political failures of the United Nations, which failed to implement the concept of “equality of states.” This is somewhat less common for the European Union – perhaps the most successful attempt to infringe upon national sovereignty and establish transnational governance in at least one part of the world. Rather relevant in this regard are the views of A. Etzioni, who believes that the EU formation process is part of the General model of political unification, but it is flawed, given a constant confrontation between the patterns of its implementation, in particular in the format of harmonization (which should be implemented through Confederation) or integration (which should mainly be implemented through Federation)⁵⁴. At the same time, the sociologist notes that integration provides a more effective and, presumably, a more successful option for political unity, which can lead to a broad and stable political consensus. In this context, the problem of the relationship between politics and language is mainly reduced to the expectation that integration implies a generally accepted balance between diversity and central power based on the model of transnational democracy. However, since this model does not exist in the reality of implementation of European diversity, especially after the EU Constitution was not adopted, the political future of democratic transnational governance is still « open » and even threatened (especially against the background of the global financial and economic crisis of 2008-2009 and the European migration crisis, starting with 2014-2015). This is especially noticeable against the background of cultural globalization (especially in the context of promoting English in the Internet, at international conferences, international transport and international communication in general), which strongly affects integration processes in the context of real language diversity.

In view of this, the construction of language diversity is often considered as make – believe, since in social life it does not always have anything to do with reality. In contrast, though language conflicts have been a real controversy between the center and the periphery, based on economic, cultural, and political hegemony. Accordingly, the differences between the theoretized and real order of language ranking are a consequence of differences in the expected political integration and the actual political process, which proves irrelevance of the idea of the end of relationship between language - politics. After all, if earlier the relationships between language and politics were mainly determined in terms of national and international conflicts within the framework of variable socio-political divisions based on language, today they are an attribute of the globalization of conflicts within the dichotomy « language-politics ».

It is largely due to the fact that one of the theoretical and methodological perspectives of the outlined issues is the interrelation of the categories “language” and “power”⁵⁵. These cat-

⁵⁴ Etzioni A., *Political Unification Revisited. On Building Supranational Communities*, Wyd. Lexington Books 2001, s. 301.

⁵⁵ Craith M., *Languages and Power: Accommodation and Resistance*, [w:] Craith M. (ed.), *Language, Power and Identity Politics*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2007, s. 1–20.

egories are related to the concept of “cultural capital” - an idea first proposed by P. Bourdieu and M. Foucault in the early ‘70s, of the 20th century. The researchers have broadened their understanding of the phenomenon of capital beyond its traditional economic explanation by distinguishing the social and linguistic (cultural) constituents of capital. The latter refers to a wide range of linguistic abilities and orientations that are available in the family and in the state in the institutionalized or non-institutionalized (artifact) form⁵⁶. In view of this, as K. Morrison points out, that language capital is defined as fluent and comfortable language proficiency in a global language by groups of people who have economic, social, cultural and political power and a status in local and global society⁵⁷. This determines that individuals and groups speaking global languages and languages of the majority have significant advantages over their counterparts, whose native languages are ranked lower by the number of speakers and, hence, their importance and are hardly needed for discussion in an economic context. In other words, those individuals and groups who speak the main or dominant language are given the economic and therefore political advantages (a kind of power)⁵⁸. Moreover, such individuals and groups receive preferences in the form of prestige and honor, since the “right” language becomes a form of peculiar capital or investment that can consolidate or enhance authority in the tangible and intangible sectors⁵⁹. Today, this mainly concerns a peculiar kind of “imperialism” of the English language, because it is the most widespread in the world as a second language. Even despite the fact that it is so differentiated and that it is used in a number of variations, even in the countries where it is native⁶⁰. Moreover, such “linguistic imperialism” is a direct testimony to a close interconnection in the “politics-power-language” triad, since the spread of the English language (and a number of other global languages) once was and still remains a linguistic-political planning strategy, on the basis of which political elite promotes its own language through power structures⁶¹ and through its displaced citizens / immigrants⁶².

In addition it should be noted that power oriented language capacity can be efficiently illustrated by the examples of the political and linguistic sphere of the European Union. In this context the EU, theoretically, should be described as a ‘force field in which the distribution of capital represents the hierarchical set of power relationships between the competing individuals, rival groups and organizations’.⁶³ The thing is that formally the EU positions itself as a forum, in

⁵⁶ Bourdieu P., *Language and Symbolic Power*, Wyd. Polity Press 1991.

⁵⁷ Morrison K., Ideology, Linguistic Capital and the Medium of Instruction in Hong Kong, *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development* 2000, vol 21, nr. 6, s. 471.

⁵⁸ Foucault M., *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, Wyd. Vintage Books 1978, s. 93.

⁵⁹ Craith M., *Languages and Power: Accommodation and Resistance*, [w:] Craith M. (ed.), *Language, Power and Identity Politics*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2007, s. 1–20.; Swarz D., Bridging the Study of Culture and Religion: Pierre Bourdieu’s Political Economy of Symbolic Power, *Sociology of Religion* 1996, vol 57, nr. 1, s. 76.

⁶⁰ Crystal D., *The Stories of English*, Wyd. Penguin 2004.

⁶¹ Phillipson R., *Linguicism: Structures and Ideologies in Linguistic Imperialism*, [w:] Cummins J., Skutnabb-Kangas T. (eds.), *Minority Education: From Shame to Struggle*, Wyd. Multilingual Matters 1988, s. 339–358.; Phillipson R., *Linguistic Imperialism*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1992.

⁶² Spolsky B., *Language Policy*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2004.

⁶³ Swarz D., Bridging the Study of Culture and Religion: Pierre Bourdieu’s Political Economy of Symbolic Power, *Sociology of Religion* 1996, vol 57, nr. 1, s. 79.

which native speakers of minority languages (or separate countries) can act cooperatively with one another at the transnational level instead of being isolated or opposed each other⁶⁴. The thing is that formally the EU positions itself as a forum, in which native speakers of minority languages (or separate countries) can act cooperatively with one another at the transnational level instead of being isolated or opposed each other⁶⁵.

Besides, power oriented language capacity should be interpreted through ideological structure of society in general and the political process in particular. The described dichotomy is cyclic because among the most important social practices, influenced by political ideologies, are language and discourse, which in turn influence the way political ideologies are forming and changing. The thing is that language and discourse are the forms of social and even political action and realities, which are always determined by certain values and norms, political conventions, ideologies and social practices and are always demarcated by the influence of power structures and historical processes. Accordingly, political discourse, as a tool and indicator of the interrelation of language and politics, is necessarily constituted by ideologically biased and unbiased opinions. In addition, political discourse is often a tool for learning and understanding ideologies⁶⁶. Therefore, ideology is not an innate, but an acquired feature and system of beliefs of particular individuals and groups⁶⁷, because it is implanted with the means of language and mainly political discourse.

Only in this form, language and discourse affect the realism of certain models of social and political action and events, which may eventually be generalized and abstracted in the form of social perceptions and ideologies⁶⁸. In such a dichotomy, each of the phenomena occupies a niche, since ideology is a system of values that generates and manages large blocks of society, and language is the “mediator” of the functioning of ideology and ideological blocks, and therefore a means of legitimizing power relations and etc. Moreover, if the legitimization of organized power relations is not articulate and purposeful, then language is also ideological⁶⁹. This means that the use of the phrase “linguistic ideology” may be appropriate, but it may have quite different meanings, such as denoting the “correct” conceptualization of the language or displaying a “misinterpretation” of the language, if different from the facts⁷⁰. In this case, the power in the language-ideology dichotomy is of particular importance to the authorities, which necessarily conceptualize both from the point of view of asymmetry between the participants

⁶⁴ Craith M., *Languages and Power: Accommodation and Resistance*, [w:] Craith M. (ed.), *Language, Power and Identity Politics*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2007, s. 1–20.

⁶⁵ Nahrkhalaji S., *Language, Ideology and Power: a Critical Approach to Political Discourse*, źródło: <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/df03/59393b3d61b2033b5a1edce8f7a7ba6cbe7.pdf?ga=2.256435788.672418996.1572779182-770480320.1572779182> [odczyt: 01.11.2019].

⁶⁶ Wodak R., *Critical linguistics and critical discourse analysis*, [w:] Verschuren J., Ostaman J., Blommaert J. (eds.), *Handbook of pragmatics—Manual*, Wyd. John Benjamins 1995, s. 204–210.

⁶⁷ Van Dijk T., *Principles of Critical discourse analysis*, [w:] Wetherell M. (ed.), *Discourse theory and practice*, Wyd. A Reader 2001, s. 300–317; Augoustinos M., *Social representations and ideology*, [w:] Flick U. (ed.), *The psychology of the social*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1998.

⁶⁸ Van Dijk T., *Ideology and discourse: a multidisciplinary introduction*, Wyd. Pompeu Fabra University 2000.

⁶⁹ Heberman J., *Theory and practice*, Wyd. Beacon 1973.

⁷⁰ Seargeant P., Language ideology, language theory, and the regulation of linguistic behavior, *“Language Sciences”* 2009, vol 31, s. 345–359.

of political discourse, and from the point of view of unequal ability to control how political discourses are created, disseminated and consumed in specific linguistic- political contexts⁷¹. Therefore, it undoubtedly argues that language can both support power and undermine trust in power⁷², certainly changing policy over time⁷³, but in the meanwhile it “denaturates” political ideologies⁷⁴ through political discourse and clarifies the political and social categories it needs.

It is a common knowledge that language is a driving force that is aimed at changing politics and society, since it affects them and depends on them. On the one hand, language describes politics, but on the other it can contribute to the distortion of the latter. A language can be used by totalitarian and authoritarian regimes and simultaneously can be used as a means of resisting them. At the same time, language policy can promote the formation of nation-states, but may threaten the existence of not only states but also ethnic groups. To sum up, it means that language has always played a certain role in politics and is a factor in socio-political differentiation and mobilization, because it is or can be both a catalyst and an interpreter of politics and political processes. Therefore, language, as an instrument of influence and social differentiation, without any doubt becomes political, but it can also be politicized. Against this background it is argued, that various socio-political differences are generated by different options for linguistic divergences, both exclusively in the political context and in the political and legal context. Empirically, it can be seen from the fact, that economic and political advantages, social prestige and the power are acquired by those individuals and groups of people, who communicate by means of the primary or dominant language, which takes the form of some kind of capital or investments. The resulting “imperialism” of language, thereby, is a strategy of linguistic-political planning, on the basis of which the political elite promotes its own language through various power structures. Eventually, it is stated that a language is a form of social and even political action and reality, which is always determined by values and moral norms, political conventions, ideologies and social practices and is always demarcated by the influence of high authorities and historical processes.

A list of references

1. Almond G., Powel B., *Comparative Politics. A Developmental Approach*, Wyd. Liltle, Brown and Co. 1966.
2. Atawneh A., The discourse of war in the Middle East: Analysis of media reporting, “*Journal of Pragmatics*”2009, vol41, s. 263–278.

⁷¹ Nahrkhalaji S., *Language, Ideology and Power: a Critical Approach to Political Discourse*, źródło: https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/df03/59393b3d61b2033b5a1edce8f7a7ba6cbe7.pdf?_ga=2.256435788.672418996.1572779182-770480320.1572779182 [odczyt: 01.11.2019].; Wodak R., 1968: *The power of political jargon*, [w:] Wodak R. (ed.), *Language, power, ideology*, Wyd. John Benjamins 1989, s. 137–163.

⁷² Atawneh A., The discourse of war in the Middle East: Analysis of media reporting, “*Journal of Pragmatics*”2009, vol41, s. 263–278.

⁷³ Tollefson J., *Planning Language, Planning Inequality: Language Policy in the Community*, Wyd. Longman 1991.; Ricento T., *Ideology, Politics and Language Policies: Introduction*, [w:] Ricento T. (ed.), *Ideology, Politics and Language Policies: Focus on English*, Wyd. John Benjamins Publishing Company 2000, s. 1–8.

⁷⁴ Fairclough N., *Critical discourse analysis*, Wyd. Longman 1995.

3. Augoustinos M., *Social representations and ideology*, [w:] Flick U. (ed.), *The psychology of the social*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1998.
4. Bourdieu P., *Language and Symbolic Power*, Wyd. Polity Press 1991.
5. Bugarski R., Language policies in the successor states of former Yugoslavia, *Journal of Language and Politics* 2004, vol 3, nr. 2, s. 189–208.
6. Craith M., *Languages and Power: Accommodation and Resistance*, [w:] Craith M. (ed.), *Language, Power and Identity Politics*, Wyd. Palgrave Macmillan 2007, s. 1–20.
7. Crystal D., *The Stories of English*, Wyd. Penguin 2004.
8. Dallmayr F., *Language and Politics*, Wyd. University of Notre Dame 1984.
9. Etzioni A., *Political Unification Revisited. On Building Supranational Communities*, Wyd. Lexington Books 2001.
10. Fairclough N., *Analysing Discourse*, Wyd. Routledge 2003.
11. Fairclough N., *Critical discourse analysis*, Wyd. Longman 1995.
12. Finlayson A., *Imagined Communities*, [w:] Nash K., Scott A. (eds), *The Blackwell Companion to Political Sociology*, Wyd. Blackwell 2001, s. 281–290.
13. Foucault M., *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, Wyd. Vintage Books 1978.
14. Gellner E., *Nations and Nationalism*, Wyd. Blackwell 1983.
15. Gruber H., Menz F., Language and political change: Micro- and macro-aspects of a contested relationship?, *Journal of Language and Politics* 2004, vol 3, nr. 2, s. 175–188.
16. Heberman J., *Theory and practice*, Wyd. Beacon 1973.
17. Holborow M., Language, ideology and neoliberalism, *Journal of Language and Politics* 2007, vol 6, nr. 1, s. 51–73.
18. Inglehart R., *Modernization and Postmodernization. Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies*, Wyd. Princeton University 1997.
19. Kramer H., Dzihic V., *Die Kosovo Bilanz. Scheitert die internationale Gemeinschaft?*, Wyd. LIT 2005.
20. Laitin D., The cultural identities of a European state, *Politics and Society* 1997, vol 25, nr. 3, s. 277–302.
21. Lane J.-E., Ersson S., *Politics and Society in Western Europe*, London 1994.
22. Lijphart A., *Democracy in Plural Societies. A Comparative Exploration*, Wyd. Yale University 1977.
23. Lipset S., *Political Man. The Social Bases of Politics*, Wyd. Johns Hopkins University 1983.
24. Loos E., Composing “panacea texts” at the European Parliament: An intertextual perspective in text production in a multilingual community, *Journal of Language and Politics* 2004, vol 4, nr. 1, s. 3–26.
25. Morrison K., Ideology, Linguistic Capital and the Medium of Instruction in Hong Kong, *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development* 2000, vol 21, nr. 6, s. 471–486.
26. Nahrkhalaji S., *Language, Ideology and Power: a Critical Approach to Political Discourse*, źródło: https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/df03/59393b3d61b2033b5a1edce8f7a7ba6cbef7.pdf?_ga=2.256435788.672418996.1572779182-770480320.1572779182 [odczyt: 01.11.2019].

27. Neisser H., Verschraegen B., *Die Europäische Union. Anspruch und Wirklichkeit*, Wyd. Springer 2001.
28. Pelinka A., *Democracy Indian Style. Subhas Chandra Bose and the Creation of India's Political Culture*, Wyd. Transaction 2003.
29. Pelinka A., Language as a political category: The viewpoint of Political Science, "Journal of Language and Politics" 2007, vol 6, nr. 1, s. 129–143.
30. Phillipson R., *Linguicism: Structures and Ideologies in Linguistic Imperialism*, [w:] Cummins J., Skutnabb-Kangas T. (eds.), *Minority Education: From Shame to Struggle*, Wyd. Multilingual Matters 1988, s. 339–358.
31. Phillipson R., *Linguistic Imperialism*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1992.
32. Reiterer A., *Doktor und Bauer. Ethnischer Konflikt und sozialer Wandel: Die Sozialstruktur der slowenischen Minderheit in Kärnten*, Wyd. Drava 1986.
33. Reiterer A., *Gesellschaft in Österreich*, Wyd. WUV 2003.
34. Ricento T., *Ideology, Politics and Language Policies: Introduction*, [w:] Ricento T. (ed.), *Ideology, Politics and Language Policies: Focus on English*, Wyd. John Benjamins Publishing Company 2000, s. 1–8.
35. Ricento T., *The limits of language policies in the United States and Canada: Vague intentions, unpredictable outcomes*, Paper presented at the American Association for Applied Linguistics Annual Conference, Washington, March 1999.
36. Rokkan S., *Staat, Nation und Demokratie in Europa. Die Theorien Stein Rokkans aus seinen gesammelten Werken rekonstruiert und eingeleitet von Peter Flora*, Wyd. Suhrkamp 2000.
37. Salzmann Z., Stanlaw J., Adachi N., *Language, Culture, and Society: An Introduction to Linguistic Anthropology*, Wyd. Westview Press 2014.
38. Sartori G., *Parties and Party Systems. A Framework for Analysis*, Wyd. ECPR 2005.
39. Seargeant P., Language ideology, language theory, and the regulation of linguistic behavior, "Language Sciences" 2009, vol 31, s. 345–359.
40. Spolsky B., *Language Policy*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2004.
41. Swarz D., Bridging the Study of Culture and Religion: Pierre Bourdieu's Political Economy of Symbolic Power, "Sociology of Religion" 1996, vol 57, nr. 1, s. 71–85.
42. Tollefson J., *Planning Language, Planning Inequality: Language Policy in the Community*, Wyd. Longman 1991.
43. Van Dijk T., *Ideology and discourse: a multidisciplinary introduction*, Wyd. Pompeu Fabra University 2000.
44. Van Dijk T., *Principles of Critical discourse analysis*, [w:] Wetherell M. (ed.), *Discourse theory and practice*, Wyd. A Reader 2001, s. 300–317.
45. Weiss H., *Nation und Toleranz? Empirische Studien zu nationalen Identitäten in Österreich*, Wyd. Braumüller 2004.
46. Wodak R., *Critical linguistics and critical discourse analysis*, [w:] Verschuren J., Ostaman J., Blommaert J. (eds.), *Handbook of pragmatics—Manual*, Wyd. John Benjamins 1995, s. 204–210.

47. Wodak R., Preface. The power of language in political discourse, *Journal of Language and Politics* 2004, vol 3, nr. 3, s. 381–383.
48. Wodak R., *1968: The power of political jargon*, [w:] Wodak R. (ed.), *Language, power, ideology*, Wyd. John Benjamins 1989, s. 137–163.
49. Wodak R., *Zur diskursiven Konstruktion nationaler Identität*, Wyd. Suhrkamp 1998.
50. Wodak R., Panagl O., *Text und Kontext. Theoriemodelle und methodische Ververfahren im transdisziplinären Vergleich*, Wyd. Königshausen & Neumann 2004.
51. Wodak R., van Dijk T., *Racism at the Top. Parliamentary Discourses on Ethnic Issues in Six European States*, Wyd. Drava 2000.
52. Woyke W., *Das politische System Belgiens*, [w:] Ismayr W. (ed.), *Die politischen Systeme Westeuropas*, Wyd. Leske + Budrich 2003, s. 389–414.